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Abstract
Wireless sensor networks are being increasingly
used for sustainable development. The task of rout-
ing in these resource-constraint networks is partic-
ularly challenging as they operate over prolonged
deployment periods, necessitating optimal use of
their resources. Moreover, due to the deployment
in unattended environments, they become an easy
target for attackers. In this paper, we propose a hi-
erarchical POMDP based approach to make routing
decisions with partial/limited information about the
sensor nodes, in a secure and energy-efficient man-
ner. We demonstrate in a large-scale simulation that
the approach provides a better energy/packet deliv-
ery tradeoff than competing methods, and also val-
idate these conclusions in a real-world testbed.
1 Introduction
Sustainable development involves detailed analysis, design
and modeling of complex systems used in making decisions
about managing natural resources. Gathering data at min-
imal cost is important to study these complex systems for
which Wireless Sensor networks (WSNs) are used [Dyo et
al., 2010]. WSNs are composed of spatially distributed sen-
sor nodes to cooperatively monitor environmental changes
over time. Sensors sense the data and transmit it to the sink
(gateway between sensor nodes and end users) through multi-
hop routing. A key challenge in sustainable development is
that the (resource-constraint [Mac Ruairı´ and Keane, 2007])
sensor nodes need to be deployed for prolonged time peri-
ods, frequently unattended in remote environments, which
not only requires the optimal use of network resources but
also strong security provisioning, as the unreliable wireless
channels and unattended operations make it very easy to com-
promise/capture the nodes. One such scenario is the monitor-
ing of oil/chemical leaks from an industry in, say a nearby
river. The monitors (government) will want to assess the true
impact of the leaks and the industry might have an incentive
to corrupt the measurements.
The use of trust systems for defending against (internal)
security attacks and performing routing has been extensively
studied in literature [Roma´n et al., 2009; Yu et al., 2012]. In-
ternal attackers [Liu et al., 2007] are malicious nodes within
the network, who can easily bypass traditional cryptographic
mechanisms. Trust schemes can identify such nodes, as they
can predict a node’s behavior (quality) both directly, via eval-
uation based on its past actions, and indirectly, using rec-
ommendations (opinions) from other nodes. However, many
trust schemes cannot effectively handle attacks targeting trust
systems themselves [Sun et al., 2006] i.e., they are heavily
affected by malicious nodes deliberately providing mislead-
ing opinions (unfair ratings) about other nodes. Also, existing
trust schemes fail to address the energy constraints of WSNs,
as they focus on accurately determining node quality but ig-
nore the overhead of such computation by relentlessly seek-
ing recommendations from all the other sensor nodes.
This paper presents a Partially Observable Markov De-
cision Process (POMDP) based trust scheme [Irissappane
et al., 2014] to simultaneously address security issues and
energy constraints while routing in WSNs. The POMDP
model [Kaelbling et al., 1998] provides a principled approach
for decision making under uncertainty, making it an ideal
choice for nodes in WSNs that need to choose a suitable next-
hop neighbor to route packets with only limited information.
But, the POMDP model for such a decision making problem
is large, and even when representing it using factored rep-
resentations [Poupart, 2005], state-of-the-art off-line solution
methods fail to find acceptable POMDP solutions. Though
on-line methods [Ross et al., 2008] can improve scalability,
they are not applicable due to the energy constraints of WSNs.
To overcome the above issues, we model the routing prob-
lem for each node using a hierarchical POMDP (called Se-
cure Routing POMDP (SRP)). We also employ factored rep-
resentations to address the complexity in solving each SRP
component. The SRP hierarchy (Fig. 1) consists of the rout-
ing POMDP for making routing decisions, the alarm POMDP
for sending/receiving alarms about malicious nodes and the
fitness POMDP to compute the fitness (suitability) of nodes
to route packets. As major contributions, we: 1) present the
SRP model which can optimize the tradeoff between better
security and energy savings in WSNs; 2) demonstrate that
SRP can effectively deal with black-hole, on-off attacks and
other attacks targeting the trust system; 3) conduct extensive
evaluation in a simulated and a real-world testbed, showing
the effectiveness of SRP against state-of-the-art trust based
routing schemes. The above contributions greatly help to fa-
cilitate the employment of WSNs in hostile environments.
2 Related Work
RFSN [Ganeriwal et al., 2008] determines the quality of a
node using the Beta distribution on the co-operation informa-
tion collected from a watchdog [Marti et al., 2000] mecha-
nism as well as from recommendations given by other nodes.
TARP [Rezgui and Eltoweissy, 2007] avoids routing through
malicious nodes by assessing their forwarding ratio using
both direct evaluation and recommendation information from
other nodes. However, the above trust schemes are not re-
silient to sophisticated unfair rating attacks which target the
trust systems and do not effectively consider the energy con-
straints of WSNs. CONFIDANT [Buchegger and Le Boudec,
2002] uses a broadcasting mechanism to send alarms about
malicious nodes, however it is still susceptible to unfair rat-
ings, where nodes can send false alarms in a sophisticated
manner. [Nurmi, 2007] proposes a POMDP based routing
scheme that estimates its state composed of neighbor nodes’
local parameters (selfishness and energy). However, it uses
gradient techniques to determine policies which (as we show
empirically), can be far from optimal. Also, it does not use
recommendation information from other sensor nodes.
Hierarchical POMDP based approaches have been stud-
ied in literature to harness the curse of dimensionality and
history in solving POMDPs [Zhang and Sridharan, 2012;
Pineau and Thrun, 2002; Theocharous, 2002; Foka and Tra-
hanias, 2007], using action based decomposition (action hi-
erarchy), state space abstraction, or both. In our approach,
we consider the action hierarchy as in [Pineau and Thrun,
2002] because the routing problem can be easily partitioned
into sub-problems based on the actions (see Fig. 1).
3 Secure Routing Problem for WSNs
We consider a network N = {ni|i = 1 · · · |N |} of sensor
nodes. The neighborhood of each node ni consists of sensors
reachable within the transmission radius r. Every node inde-
pendently optimizes its routing behavior and chooses a next-
hop neighbor (using the SRP model described in Sec. 5) to
route packets to the sink. The following paragraphs describe
the important aspects involved in this decision problem.
Fitness (for routing purposes) For a node ni, a next-
hop neighbor nj is chosen based on its fitness (fj ∈
{good, bad}) in routing packets, calculated using the fitness
factors: residual-energy, distance and routing behavior.
Residual-Energy: f.ej ∈ {high, low} denotes the remain-
ing energy in nj , to route packets. We use [Heinzelman et
al., 2000] to determine nj’s actual energy e(nj) and then dis-
cretize1 it (to use standard POMDP solvers): f.ej=high, if
e(nj) is greater than half its initial value and low, otherwise.
Distance: Distance D(nj , sink) of nj from the sink is de-
termined by broadcasting HELLO 〈source, hopCount〉mes-
sages. Initially, 〈source = sink, hopCount = 0〉 is broad-
cast from the sink. The neighboring nodes of the sink receive
this message and determine their distance by incrementing
hopCount. The new hopCount is then re-broadcast to each
1Though a larger number of behaviors is possible, in order to
find a good POMDP strategy it may suffice to consider a moderate
number of values (see ’robustness’ experiments in Fig. 5(a)).
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Figure 1: Secure Routing POMDP (SRP) action hierarchy.
node’s neighbors. To discretize1 the distance values, for node
nj , f.dj=near, ifD(nj , sink)<D(ni, sink), else f.dj=far.
Routing Behavior: Node nj can forward the packets sent to
it i.e., f.rbj=forward, or drop packets f.rbj=drop, exhibit-
ing network based attacks [Karlof and Wagner, 2003], such
as: 1) black-hole attack, where node nj drops packets with
probability pd=1, always; 2) on-off attack, where pd=1 only
during specific intervals of time, and pd=0 otherwise, etc.
Message Protocols To determine the above fitness factors
of fj , node ni can request opinions (query action) about node
nj from another neighbor nj′ using a QUERY 〈ni, nj′ , nj〉
message2 . A REPLY 〈nj′ , ni, nj , f.ej , f.dj , f.rbj〉 message
is then sent by nj′ about the fitness factors of nj . Node
ni can also opt to route packets (route action) to nj , to de-
termine its fitness factors. Once ni routes packets to nj ,
nj sends an acknowledgement ACK 〈nj , ni, f.ej , f.dj〉 mes-
sage2, informing ni about its residual-energy and distance
values. Node ni also employs a watchdog mechanism [Marti
et al., 2000] to peek nj’s transmission packets and monitor
its routing behavior f.rbj , whether it actually forwards/drops
the sent packets. Thus, the actual values of f.ej , f.dj and
f.rbj can be determined by routing packets to nj . Node
ni can also send/receive ALARM 〈ni, nj , f.ej , f.dj , f.rbj〉
messages, carrying information about a malicious node nj .
Unfair RatingsWhen sending a REPLY to a QUERY mes-
sage, node nj′ can be unfair by providing misleading opin-
ions about nj . We use a variable rj′ to denote the trustwor-
thiness of nj′ in its rating behavior, when providing opin-
ions about other nodes. nj′ can be truthful (rj′=true) or pro-
vide unfair ratings about nj , exhibiting any of the following
attacks [Jiang et al., 2013]: 1) random (rj′=rand), where
nj′ randomly provides fair and unfair ratings; 2) adversar-
ial (rj′=adv), where nj′ always provides unfair ratings; 3)
camouflage (rj′=cam), where nj′ is honest in the beginning
and provides unfair ratings after φ packet transmissions; 4)
collusive-unfair (rj′=coll), where attackers form the majority
in the system and always promote their neighbors.
Overall Goal Given that ni can use query and route ac-
tions to determine the fitness factors of its neighbors, there
exists a tradeoff as querying information can lead to energy
drain, while routing through malicious nodes can lead to
packet drop. To balance the tradeoff of information gain-
ing (query) actions and exploitation (route/alarm) actions,
we adopt a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process
(POMDP) model, which selectively queries for information
2In case of no response (REPLY/ACK) from a node, it can be
queried again max times, after which it will be deemed malicious.
to select a suitable next-hop neighbor to successfully route
packets (and send alarms, if necessary), thereby minimizing
energy consumption and maximizing lifetime of the sensor
nodes. Sec. 4 gives a brief description of a POMDP model.
4 POMDP
A POMDP [Kaelbling et al., 1998] can be described by the tu-
ple 〈S,A, T,R,Ω, O〉: given that the environment has a state
s ∈ S, the POMDP agent takes some action a ∈ A, causing a
state transition from s to s′, using T , the transition model that
specifies probabilities Pr(s′|s, a). The agent also receives ob-
servations (o ∈ Ω) based on the observation model O, speci-
fying the probabilities Pr(o|a, s′). For a transition, the agent
receives a rewardR(s, a, s′). We also assume an infinite hori-
zon problem. The POMDP agent maintains a belief b ∈ B,
i.e., a probability distribution over states via Bayes’ rule. If
b(s) specifies the probability of s (∀ s), the updated belief b′
after taking action a and receiving observation o is given by,
b′(s′)=
Pr(s′, o|b, a)
Pr(o|b, a) =
Pr(o|a, s′)
Pr(o|b, a)
∑
s
Pr(s′|s, a)b(s) (1)
A POMDP policy maps beliefs to actions and is associated
with a value function Vpi(b) that specifies the expected total
reward of executing policy pi starting from b. The objective
of a POMDP agent is to find an optimal POMDP policy pi∗,
which maximizes the expected total reward. Unfortunately,
the routing problem in WSNs is too large to be modeled as
a single POMDP (finding the optimal policy is intractable,
PSPACE complete). As factored solvers [Poupart, 2005] do
not scale sufficiently to large problems and online planning
algorithms cannot be applied to the energy-constraint WSNs,
we propose an hierarchical approach, while still using fac-
tored solvers to solve the individual hierarchical components.
5 Secure Routing POMDP (SRP)
Here, we propose a hierarchical formulation (as shown in
Fig. 1) for the secure routing problem, exploiting the fact that
this problem admits a natural decomposition in sub-tasks. In
particular, at the higher level, we select a next-hop neighbor
based on its fitness, performed by the routing POMDP (RP).
At the lower level, we evaluate the fitness of the nodes based
on more detailed observations and trust propagation mecha-
nisms, handled by the fitness POMDP (FP). Additionally, we
investigate whether adding functionality to raise alarms about
potentially unfit neighbors can improve the overall WSN per-
formance. This alarm functionality is isolated in a separate
component: the alarm POMDP (AP).
The hierarchy functions as follows: every time a node re-
ceives a packet to route, an episode of RP is activated. This
episode can trigger multiple episodes of FP by using the
‘evaluate’ (evalj) actions to evaluate the fitness of its neigh-
bors. As such, each episode of FP has as its goal to provide
an estimation of the fitness of a specific node (say nj). To this
end, FP can ask different nodes about the various fitness fac-
tors of nj (implemented using QUERY messages, described
in Sec. 3). When FP is certain enough, it reports that nj is
‘good’ (g) or ‘bad’ (b), thereby ending the FP episode. At
this point, control is transferred back to RP which receives
the report (g or b) as an observation, using which it updates its
high-level belief about the fitness of the node. Each episode
of RP ends by selecting a neighbor to route packets.
The AP (if present) is activated after each packet is handled
by RP. The goal of AP is to send alarms about nodes that seem
unfit (if no alarm has been sent about them yet). For this,
AP can also call FP to perform node evaluations. AP is also
activated when an alarm is received from one neighbor about
another neighbor. In this case, AP should decide whether or
not to process the alarm [Buchegger and Le Boudec, 2002],
which may/may not lead to a belief update.
5.1 Routing POMDP (RP)
The main goal of RP is to determine a fit next-hop neighbor
to route packets. The states, actions, observations and re-
wards for RP are described in Table 1. RP maintains a belief
over the overall fitness fj of each neighboring node (nj) i.e.,
fj = good(g), if nj is fit to route packets and fj = bad(b), if
nj is unfit. To determine fj , it uses the evaluate action∼evalj
and decides a next-hop neighbor nj using routej action. The
donR (do not route to any neighboring node) action is taken
when no nodes are fit to route packets. There is a cost asso-
ciated with the ∼evalj action. We assume that selecting an
unfit neighbor to route packets will fail to transmit packets to
the sink and thus a penalty R(f ′j=b, routej) is levied. Sim-
ilarly, a reward R(f ′j=g, routej) is given for selecting a fit
node which can successfully transmit packets to the sink. We
can also see that ∼evalj is an abstract action which in turn
calls FP (action hierarchy for SRP is shown in Fig. 1).
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′
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Figure 2: RP: (a) DBN for∼eval1 action; (b) (Partial) Policy.
To specify the transition and observation functions, we de-
scribe the model for a two-node neighborhood (∈ {n1, n2}).
We follow the factored representation [Poupart, 2005], which
uses Dynamic Bayesian Networks (DBNs) with Conditional
Probability Tables (CPTs) to compactly represent the state
spaces. The transition and observation probabilities for the
∼evalj=1 action is shown in Fig. 2(a). Here, transitions are
static and observation o′fit depends on fitness f
′
1 of n1. The
transition and observation probabilities for the higher level
POMDPs (RP, AP) can be learned from the behavior of FP
(similar to layered learning [Stone and Veloso, 1998]). Thus,
probabilities for o′fit in Fig. 2(a), are learned based on the pol-
icy of FP (by conducting experiments as described in Sec. 6).
To briefly illustrate the belief updating process in RP,
Fig. 2(b) shows a (partial) routing policy for the two-node
(∈ {n1, n2}) neighborhood. The beliefs prior to taking the
POMDP States Observations Actions Rewards
routing fj ∈ {g, b} ofit ∈ {g, b} ∼evalj R(∼evalj) = −10
routej R(f
′
j = g, routej) = 150
donR R(f ′j = b, routej) = −200
idle R(idle) = −3
alarm fj ∈ {g, b} ofit ∈ {g, b} ∼evalj R(∼evalj) = −10
alarmFrom ∈ {1, · · · k} ofrom ∈ {1, · · · k} process R(f ′from = g/b, process) = 50/− 100
alarmAbout ∈ {1, · · · k} oabout ∈ {1, · · · k} sendj R(f ′j=b/g, sendj)=50/−100
alarmSentj ∈ {yes, no} osent ∈ {1, · · · k} idle R(idle) = −3
fitness f.ej ∈ {high, low} oener ∈ {high, low} askjj′ R(askjj′ ) = −10
f.dj ∈ {near, far} odist ∈ {near, far} reportGood R(f ′node = g, reportGood) = 150
f.rbj ∈ {forward, drop} orb ∈ {forward, drop} reportBad R(f ′node = b, reportGood) = −200
rj ∈ {true, rand, adv, camsleep, camact, coll} or ∈ {true, lie} R(f ′node = bad, reportBad) = 150
evaluation node ∈ {1, · · · k} onode ∈ {1, · · · k} R(f ′node = g, reportBad) = −200
fj ∈ {g, b} idle R(idle) = −3
∗rand− random, adv − adversarial, cam− camouflage, act− active, coll− collusive-unfair
Table 1: State, action, observation variables, rewards specified in SRP. Variable j is a vector of k=no. of neighbors elements.
actions (represented by nodes in Fig. 2(b)) are shown us-
ing tables associated with the nodes. Here, we present the
marginal beliefs on the fitness of nodes f1, f2 ∈ {g, b}. As a
sample state, gg represents that both n1 and n2 are fit to route
packets. Initially, RP assumes uniform quality levels for f1,
f2 (0.5 g, 0.5 b). On taking action ∼eval1, when observation
g is received (traversing through left child of the tree), beliefs
are updated (using Eqn. 1) such that more weights are given
to states where f1 is good (gg = 0.45, gb = 0.45) and route1
action is taken. The beliefs when observation is b, are shown
using right children of the tree, resulting in donR action.
5.2 Alarm POMDP (AP)
There are two modes in which AP can operate: 1) ‘periodic’
mode after every packet transmission by node ni, to send
alarms about malicious (unfit) nodes; 2) ‘triggered’ mode af-
ter receiving an incoming alarm, to decide whether to process
alarms received from other nodes. AP maintains beliefs over
the fitness fj ∈ {g, b} of each neighboring node and uses the
∼evalj action (as shown in Table 1) to determine them. It
can broadcast alarms about a malicious node nj using the
sendj action. To avoid re-broadcasting the same alarms,
the alarms sent are tracked using alarmSentj ∈ {yes, no}
variable. When AP is triggered on receiving an alarm from
alarmFrom about node alarmAbout, it decides either to
process these alarms, leading to a subsequent belief update
about the fitness of node alarmAbout or simply ignore them.
There is a reward/penaltyR(f ′j=b/g, sendj) for broadcasting
truthful/false alarms about nj . There is also a reward/penalty
R(f ′from=g/b, process) for processing truthful/false alarms
from good/bad nodes, respectively.
The DBN and CPT3 for ∼evalj action are similar to
Fig. 2(a). For process action, observation o′fit depends on the
fitness of nodes alarmFrom and alarmAbout. To deal with
both ‘periodic’ and ‘triggered’ functionalities in the same
POMDP, we introduce an auxiliary (dummy) first time step in
AP: the initial belief is an uniform random distribution over
the alarmFrom, alarmAbout, alarmSentj variables, but
during the second time step, the agent receives perfect obser-
vations about these factors, leading to beliefs that only have
positive probabilities for the states that are consistent with
3Figures are not shown due to space constraints.
the required functionality. Transition for alarmSentj is such
that alarmSentj=yes on sending an alarm about nj . We also
add some randomness to model variable delay forgetting.
5.3 Fitness POMDP (FP)
The main goal of FP is to evaluate the fitness of a specific
node, and report it to the higher level POMDPs. Apart from
maintaining beliefs on the fitness of each neighbor nj i.e.,
fj∈{g, b}, FP also maintains beliefs over the individual fac-
tors that make up fj , i.e., residual-energy f.ej , distance f.dj ,
and routing behavior f.rbj . The rating behavior of nj in pro-
viding opinions is also maintained using variable rj . When-
ever the ∼evalj action is taken by RP or AP, FP is acti-
vated. To determine fitness of nj (evaluation node in Ta-
ble 1), FP can query nj′ using askjj′ action, which trans-
lates to QUERY and REPLY messages (see Sec. 3). The
reportGood/reportBad action is then taken, determining fit-
ness of nj to be g/b, respectively, which are then reported as
observations to update the high-level beliefs about the fitness
of node nj in RP or AP. There is a reward/penalty for cor-
rectly/incorrectly determining the node’s quality.
Fig. 3(a) shows the DBN and CPT of the ask12 (query n2
about fitness of n1) action. Apart from the state variables
for node n1, the DBN also contains a variable r2, which de-
notes the rating behavior i.e., trustworthiness of n2 in provid-
ing truthful opinions about n1. The observation probabilities
for o′rb ∈ {forward(w), drop(d)} depend on the routing be-
havior f.rb′1 of n1 and rating behavior r
′
2 of n2. o
′
ener and
o′dist have similar probability values
3 as o′rb. The observation
probabilities for o′rb encode that asking a trustworthy node
(r′2 = true) gives more accurate observations (with 90%
probability) than untrustworthy nodes. Specifically, random,
adversarial nodes provide unfair ratings with 50%, 80%
probability, respectively. camouflage nodes, are honest in
the beginning, then provide unfair ratings with 70% probabil-
ity. To model such change in behavior, we consider two state
variables i.e., camsleep (to represent the honest phase) and
camact(ive) (to represent the unfair rating phase), such that,
nodes in the camsleep state can transition to camact state with
a 50% probability. collusive−unfair are groups of nodes,
providing unfair ratings with 70% probability. Though the
above probabilities may not represent the true node behav-
iors, they are still effective in identifying the unfair raters as
f1 f ′1
f.e1 f.e′1 o
′
ener
f.d1 f.d′1 o
′
dist
f.rb1 f.rb′1 o
′
rb
r1 r′1 o
′
r
r2 r′2
r′2 f.rb′1 Pr(o′rb|f.rb
′
1,r
′
2)
w d
true w 0.90 0.10
rand w 0.50 0.50
adv w 0.20 0.80
camsleep w 0.70 0.30
camact w 0.30 0.70
coll w 0.30 0.70
true d 0.10 0.90
rand d 0.50 0.50
adv d 0.80 0.20
camsleep d 0.30 0.70
camact d 0.70 0.30
coll d 0.70 0.30
(a)
f.rb1
f.e1
f1
f.d1
(b)
Figure 3: (a) DBN for ask12 action of FP. State variables
without a CPT are ‘static’, preserving the previous value with
probability 1; (b) Initial state distribution for fitness f1.
demonstrated by our experiments in Sec. 6.
However, in Fig. 3(a), there is no observation for the fit-
ness f1 of n1. Instead, we specify in the initial state distribu-
tion of FP, how the different fitness factors (f.e1, f.d1, f.rb1)
contribute to f1 (Fig. 3(b), Eqn. 2). The specific probabil-
ities are given in Eqn. 3 and 4, where Ngood is the number
of positive fitness factors i.e., number of times f.e1=high,
f.d1=near, f.rb1=forward andNbad is the number of nega-
tive fitness factors i.e., number of times f.e1=low, f.d1=far,
f.rb1=drop. Thus, even though we do not get direct obser-
vations about f1, now it will be updated as part of the overall
belief update. reportGood, reportBad actions merely notify
about fitness of a node and do not receive any observations.
b0(s)=b0(f1|f.e1,f.d1,f.rb1) b0(f.e1) b0(f.d1) b0(f.rb1)· · · (2)
b0(f1 = g|f.e1, f.d1, f.rb1) = Ngood
Ngood +Nbad
(3)
b0(f1 = b|f.e1, f.d1, f.rb1) = Nbad
Ngood +Nbad
(4)
The belief updating process3 in FP follows a similar approach
as that of RP (shown in Fig. 2(b)).
5.4 Parallel Belief Update
The belief update takes place separately for RP, AP and
FP. For a routing task, RP and FP are active i.e., when
RP takes the ∼evalj action, FP is called and based on the
reportGood/reportBad action of FP, observation good/bad
is received by RP. However, in this case the beliefs about nj
are updated only in RP and left outdated in AP. To update the
knowledge about nj even in AP, we introduce the idle action
(in each POMDP). Whenever the ∼evalj action is called in
RP and beliefs are updated about nj , the idle action of AP
is also called to update the beliefs on nj . Similarly, when
∼evalj action is called by AP, idle action is taken in RP.
Whenever the actual fitness factors i.e., f.ej , f.dj andf.rbj
of nj are determined after the routing process (as described
in Sec. 3), the idle action is taken by FP to update the beliefs
about nj , resulting in reportGood/reportBad action. Based
on these actions, the idle actions of both the RP and AP are
taken, to update the beliefs about nj .
6 Performance Evaluation
We conduct experiments in a simulated environment as well
as a real-world testbed and compare the performance of SRP
with RFSN [Ganeriwal et al., 2008], CONFIDANT [Bucheg-
ger and Le Boudec, 2002] and Nurmi [Nurmi, 2007]. To show
the usefulness of AP, we compare the results of SRP with and
without AP denoted by SRP and SRP-NAP, respectively. To
verify the usefulness of the hierarchical structure, we imple-
mented SRP without any hierarchy, but the method failed to
find a reasonable solution (due to the large state/action space),
thus not shown in the results. We measure the average Packet
Delivery Ratio (PDR) i.e, ratio of data packets successfully
delivered to the sink and Residual-Energy (RE) i.e., average
(remaining) energy of each sensor node in the network.
To learn the observation probabilities for ∼evalj action of
RP (AP) based on the policy of FP (for which we manually
specify the probabilities), we use a maximum likelihood ap-
proach. Using (offline) simulations, we run SRP and ran-
domly select 500 actions of RP (AP) which invoke FP. We
measure the number of instances where FP correctly identi-
fies a node’s quality and determine the probability of receiv-
ing a correct/incorrect observation for ∼evalj action to be
0.87/0.13, respectively. Also, the RP, AP and FP policies are
computed (using Symbolic Perseus [Poupart, 2005]) offline,
assuming a maximum neighborhood size M 4.
For simulation, we use the SWANS Simulator [Barr et al.,
2005]. We consider 100 stationary nodes, uniformly ran-
domly distributed within a 1000m×1000m square, with the
sink at its right end. The transmission radius is 100m and
M=5. Each node generates packets at the rate λ=1 per time
step. The size of each data packet is 512 bytes, HELLO
packet is 60 bytes, QUERY, ALARM and ACK packet is 125
bytes. The initial energy of each sensor node is 2J . The radio
dissipates 50 nJ/bit to run the transmitter/receiver circuitry
and 100 pJ/bit/m2 for the transmitter amplifier. We consider
20% of the nodes to be compromised. The experiments are
run for 100 time steps, transmitting over 10, 000 data packets.
Fig. 4(a-h) show the PDR and residual-energy of the rout-
ing schemes under different attacking scenarios. In Fig. 4(a),
under black-hole attack, SRP and SRP-NAP achieve the high-
est PDR (97% after 100 time steps). SRP performs slightly
better than SRP-NAP, especially in the beginning, as it iden-
tifies malicious nodes earlier by propagating alarms. SRP,
SRP-NAP, RFSN, CONFIDANT use both direct evaluation
and recommendations, while Nurmi uses only direct evalua-
tion, one of the reasons for its low PDR (73%), apart from
the limitation of using gradient techniques for computing
policy. In Fig. 4(b), SRP obtains a lower residual-energy
(1.61J) than SRP-NAP (1.70J), as SRP additionally sends
alarms. RFSN queries all neighbors and CONFIDANT re-
lentlessly sends alarms about malicious nodes, obtaining a
lower residual-energy. Nurmi does not query other nodes,
obtaining a high residual-energy. Fig. 4(c-d) show similar re-
sults, where on-off attackers drop packets every 5 time steps.
In Fig. 4(e-h), the 20% compromised nodes (black-hole at-
tackers) also target the trust system by providing unfair rat-
4Non-existent nodes will be considered malicious.
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Figure 4: Performance of the routing schemes in terms of Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) and Residual-Energy (RE), in a simu-
lated environment: (a-h) different attacking scenarios; (i-l) different load characteristics.
ings (showing random, collusive-unfair behavior)5. SRP
and SRP-NAP can effectively identify unfair raters as they
model such behaviors as a part of their POMDP states. In
Fig. 4(e-f), under random attack, SRP, SRP-NAP achieve
high performance. In Fig. 4(g-h), under collusive-unfair at-
tack, unfair raters are increased to 60%, forming the major-
ity. SRP (PDR 96%) performs better than SRP-NAP as it
easily identifies attackers by propagating alarms, while SRP-
NAP (PDR 93%) initially obtains misleading opinions from
the colluders, thereby routing through malicious nodes, un-
til their actual behavior is identified after routing. Further
Fig. 4(a-h) also show that AP indeed improves the perfor-
mance of SRP (PDR of SRP is always greater than SRP-NAP,
though AP involves additional energy drain, in some cases).
Fig. 4(i-l) show the results (under collusive-unfair attack5),
when network environment changes. SRP performs better un-
der uniform load (λ=1 per node) as well as under non-uniform
load (λ∈[0, 1] is selected randomly per node). Also, PDR of
all schemes increase with the number of nodes, as probability
of finding a more reliable route to sink increases. Since most
probabilities in SRP are manually specified (e.g., random
nodes provide unfair ratings with probability pu=50%), we
analyze the robustness of SRP to the specification of such val-
ues when the actual behaviors of random nodes change: 1)
SRP-60, where pu=60% instead of 50% (as assumed in FP);
2) SRP-40, where pu=40%; 3) SRP-50 for perfectly random
nodes with pu=50%. Fig. 5(a) show that even when interact-
ing with advisors that act differently than those assumed in
FP, performance of SRP is robust (relatively better than its
CONFIDANT counterpart).
We also conduct experiments on a real testbed, consisting
of 10 sensor nodes placed randomly in a 5×10 m2 in-door
space. Each node is built on an Arduino Due board, with a
XBee- Pro RF Module for radio transmission, a SHT21 Digi-
5Experiments on other attacks exhibit similar conclusion and are
not shown here due to space constraints.
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Figure 5: Experiments on: (a) Robustness; (b) Real testbed.
tal Sensor Module for temperature sensing and a TOL-10617
LiPo Fuel Gauge for measuring energy. The neighborhood
radius is 5m, size of packets is 62 bytes, initial node energy
is 2J and λ=1. Fig. 5(b), under collusive-unfair attack5, show
that SRP (PDR 91.5%) outperforms other schemes.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We present the Secure Routing POMDP (SRP) approach,
to select suitable next-hop neighbors and successfully route
packets to the sink. SRP can deal with black-hole, on-off at-
tacks, etc., and attacks targeting the trust system. It balances
the exploration/exploitation tradeoff in gaining/exploiting in-
formation about sensor nodes, thereby effectively address-
ing their energy constraints. We model SRP using hier-
archical and factored representations to address the com-
plexity in solving POMDPs. Experiments show that SRP
consistently achieves higher packet delivery rates by coping
with various attacks, while still maintaining high residual-
energy. Thus, we guarantee reliable, energy-efficient routing
in WSNs, which are key factors in sustainable development.
While we established that SRP is robust against the choice
of parameters for transition and observation models, an inter-
esting direction of future work is to automatically optimize
these. We will also investigate using finite-state controllers,
which can be more energy-efficient [Grzes´ et al., 2013].
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